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SPACS AND THE JOBS ACT
Usha Rodrigues

†

Public Inroads in Private Equity
The law has long confined the average investor to trading in public securities1
while allowing wealthy—or “accredited”2—individual investors access to a panoply of
private securities, including investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity
funds. Nevertheless, pressure to let the general public into private equity has been
growing. Two forces have contributed to this mounting pressure. First, public investors
are eager to try their hand at investing in private enterprise. Second, private firms need
capital. In the face of these forces, the sharp line that has long separated public and
private firms has become increasingly blurred.3
Consider the story of the emerging growth company (EGC), or “Initial Public
Offering (IPO) on-ramp,” provision of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act). In its first few months on the books, this provision had effects far different from
what its drafters envisioned. The JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp was intended to ease regular
†

Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank Mike Stegemoller
and the staff of the Harvard Business Law Review. Any errors are my own.
1
See, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
2
Rule 501 of Regulation D describes several categories of accredited investors, including certain
banks, charitable organizations, and certain high net worth individuals, who may invest in securities that
are not registered. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2012). Most notably, individuals with a net annual income of
over $200,000 or a total net worth of over one million dollars may invest in securities that are not
registered provided that those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502 (2012).
3
For a few recent scholarly discussions of the public-private divide, see Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act
(Georgetown Law and Econ. Research Paper, No. 12-002, 2012) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984686; Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in
Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good (Univ. of
Mich.
Law
&
Econ.
Research
Paper
No.
12-010,
2012)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103246; Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty
Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the author).
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companies’ path to going public; instead, it has inadvertently made it easier for the
average investor to get a taste of private equity via special purpose acquisition
corporations (SPACs). This piece will briefly describe SPACs, the IPO on-ramp, and
how shell companies have taken advantage of a legislative provision intended to bring
cash-hungry young companies directly to market. This piece will close with a few
thoughts on lessons the story of SPACs’ interaction with the JOBS Act may offer
regarding the increasingly indistinct line that divides public and private investment.
Introducing SPACs
A SPAC is a type of “blank-check” company that goes public to raise a pool of
cash and then begins a hunt for a target.4 The bulk of the IPO proceeds are locked up in a
trust account, invested in government-backed securities, and kept safe from the
interference of the managers.5 Once a target is identified, the SPAC managers disclose
material financial information about it to shareholders, who then have a say on whether
the acquisition occurs by way of voting or opt-out rights.6 If no suitable target is found, or
if a shareholder is unhappy with the deal, she can receive most of her money back—an
average of ninety-eight cents on the dollar—from the trust account.7 But if a SPAC
shareholder does like the deal, then she will end up having owned a piece of an
acquisition vehicle—in essence, a one-off private equity fund.8
The beauty of the SPAC model is that it bifurcates the process of going public,
making it faster and cheaper. When the SPAC itself goes public, it is basically an empty
shell, so any disclosures required under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) are
minimal and cheap.9 The SPAC’s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
filings are likewise minimal; in essence, they involve nothing more than reporting the rate
of return generated in the trust account.10 If and when the SPAC acquires a target—
4

Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 225 (2008)
(“SPACs are a species of private equity: these are capital pools organized to acquire individual
businesses. But because of the general requirement that the initial acquisition comprise eighty percent of
its assets, SPACs typically only acquire a single privately-held business. Despite these important
distinctions, SPACs otherwise attempt to mimic private equity returns by employing comparable
structures and practices. For example, SPACs utilize similar leverage to increase the size and potential
returns of their acquisitions. The managers of SPACs are also typically provided twenty percent of the
initial share offering at nominal amounts; ownership they are required to maintain until and after
consummation of an acquisition.”).
9
Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: Spac and Span, or Blank Check
Redux?, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 931, 950–51 (2007) (describing typical SPAC registration disclosure).
10
Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 4.

18

SPACS AND THE JOBS ACT

VOLUME 3

usually a private company—that target immediately becomes public without the hassle,
disclosures, and delay that accompany a typical IPO.11
JOBS Act and SPACs
SPACs offered a rare chance for the average investor to participate in the rarified
world of investing in private targets, while simultaneously offering those targets an easy
route to an IPO. The JOBS Act took a decidedly different approach to blurring the line
between public and private investment. Rather than letting the general public into private
equity investments, the drafters tried the converse: encouraging more private firms to go
public. Yet despite the JOBS Act’s focus on making it easier to bring traditional
operating companies to the public market, its provisions have proven unexpectedly
appealing for SPACs. Thus, legislation intended to help conventional companies go
public is also facilitating a form of private equity investment.
SPACs’ business structure was in place long before the passage of the JOBS Act;
indeed, they predated the Act by more than a decade.12 The whole point of the JOBS
Act’s EGC provision was to coax small-cap companies into going public by reducing the
burdens of public disclosure and ongoing federal regulation, thereby providing the benefit
of access to the public capital markets previously unavailable to them. I thought surely
the passage of the JOBS Act was bad news for SPACs. Why agree to be acquired by a
SPAC when you can easily go public on your own? The JOBS Act, however, had an
unanticipated effect on the SPAC market because the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp provision
makes it easier and cheaper for any small corporation to go public.13
As it turned out, the JOBS Act was not all bad news for SPACs because many
SPACs themselves decided to go public using the IPO on-ramp. Indeed, in the eight
weeks after the JOBS Act’s passage, over a dozen of the companies taking advantage of
the new on-ramp option were SPACs.14 Four months after the JOBS Act’s passage, one
out of every nine EGCs was a SPAC.15 The trend has not abated; in the first half of
August 2012, one out of five firms that made use of the IPO on-ramp provision were
SPACs.16 To say the least, SPACs are making good use of the EGC option.
11

Some call SPACs back-door IPOs, but SPACs differ from the seedier reverse mergers that led
to so many Chinese companies with questionable accounting practices going public. Id.
12
Riemer, supra note 9, at 944–45.
13
For example, emerging growth companies need to disclose only two years of audited financial
information prior to going public. 15 U.S.C.A. 77g(a)(2)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). They are not subject to
Sarbanes-Oxley’s dreaded internal controls provision. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b) (West 2009& Supp. 2012)
amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
14
Emily Chasan, Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012, at B1.
15
Chris Hitt, “I Am Shocked, Shocked”: Blank Check Companies and the “Scandal” of the JOBS
Act, BLOGMOSAIC (Aug. 16, 2012), http://blogmosaic.knowledgemosaic.com/2012/08/16/spacs-as-egcs/.
16
Id.
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At first blush, SPACs’ use of the JOBS Act’s on-ramp seems counter-intuitive. It
already was, and still is, easy for SPACs to go public under the conventional 1933 Act
registration process. After all, SPACs’ disclosures at the start-up phase are largely
boilerplate, along the lines of “this is who we are, this is how much money we plan to
raise, this is how much we are setting aside in trust.”17 If it is so easy for SPACs to
register under the 1933 Act, why should they bother with the on-ramp provision offered
by the JOBS Act?
The answer to this question stems from economic realities. As it turns out,
successful SPACs—that is, SPACs that complete acquisitions—can save a lot of money
in securities regulation compliance costs by making use of the IPO on-ramp. The payoff
comes from greatly reduced ongoing reporting requirements imposed by the Exchange
Act. In particular, EGC status under the JOBS Act lasts up to five years, as long as
revenues, market capitalization, and debt issuances stay low,18 and with that status come
“scaled-back disclosures, certain exemptions to executive-compensation disclosures and
attestation requirements for the auditors.”19 These features make EGC SPACs
comparatively more attractive to potential targets. A private company looking to go
public on the cheap (i.e., at even less expense than the JOBS Act’s on-ramp promises)
might well favor an EGC SPAC acquirer that promises lower disclosure burdens over a
traditional public company acquirer—or, for that matter, a non-EGC SPAC—both of
which would require the Exchange Act’s more in-depth disclosure. Time will tell whether
EGC SPACs prove to be more successful acquirers than traditional acquirers and nonEGC SPACs.
In sum, despite reformers’ best intentions, many of the first companies to file as
EGCs were not small operating companies rushing to access the capital markets as soon
as regulatory barriers fell away. Instead, they were firms looking to acquire private firms
down the road and take them public. Even so, the net effect may be what the JOBS Act’s
drafters intended: if these new EGC SPACs have their way, they will acquire private
firms, and thus bring more small firms to the public markets. Yet the SPAC EGCs will
accomplish this goal in a roundabout way. More small firms will go public, as the JOBS
Act envisioned, but by way of shell companies that allow the general public to participate
in the uniquely public form of private equity that SPACs offer. While successful EGC
SPACs will thus bring more firms public, they will at the same time allow their own
investors to participate in a species of private equity investment, a kind of investment
traditionally reserved for accredited investors. All of this supports a telling conclusion:
both regulators and the market itself are exerting pressure on the line separating public
and private investment, and these two separate forces can combine to produce
unanticipated results.
17

See, e.g., Acquicor Tech. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2005).
15 U.S.C.A. 77b(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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Blurring the Line Between Public and Private
In conclusion, SPACs and the JOBS Act, both considered singly and taken
together, signal the mounting pressure building over the divide between public and
private investment. SPACs are mechanisms that let the public make private equity-like
investments. The IPO on-ramp is an attempt to entice private companies to the public
markets. Yet even more tellingly, these separate phenomena have recently interacted in
an unexpected way, revealing how difficult it can be for reformers to revise the publicprivate boundary with any degree of certainty.
SPACs and the JOBS Act’s IPO on-ramp are but two examples of recent trends
that suggest that the line separating the public and private investment spheres may be
blurring. Another example, the CROWDFUND Act, applies pressure on the other side of
the public-private line: rather than making it easier for more private companies to access
the public markets, it allows unaccredited investors a chance to invest limited sums in
private companies for the first time.20
Securities regulation ultimately involves a delicate balancing act, with investors’
need for protection and firms’ thirst for capital pulling in opposite directions. The
traditional balance reserved robust investor protection for the public markets, and allowed
wealthy investors exclusive access to more risky, and potentially more profitable, private
firm investment.21 But SPACs are a sign that the general public also desires to furnish
capital to private firms in exchange for the chance to earn a higher rate of return. At the
same time, the JOBS Act signals a desire on the part of regulators and firms alike to
allow companies to enjoy the benefits of being public while reducing some of the burdens
that have traditionally accompanied public status. Such examples thus, in different ways,
indicate that the public-private boundary may be shifting dramatically.

20

Title III of the JOBS Act, the CROWDFUND Act, allows issuers to sell up to one million
dollars of securities in a twelve-month period without Securities Act of 1933 registration. Any investor
can invest in these companies—they are not reserved for accredited investors only. If an investor’s annual
net worth or income is less than $100,000, she can invest no more than 5% of her net worth or annual
income or $2,000, whichever is greater. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L No. 112-106, sec.
302, § 4(a)(6)(B)(i), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012). If an investor’s annual net worth or annual income is
equal to or more than $100,000, then she can invest no more than the greater of 10% of her net worth or
annual income and $100,000. Id.
21
Individuals qualify as accredited investors by having a net annual income of over $200,000 or a
total net worth of over one million dollars. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012). SEC regulations and industry
practice dictates that only this special class of individual investors can invest in hedge funds, private
equity funds, and venture capital funds. Thus, historically at least, ordinary investors have been shut out
of the private market, except via pension funds that in effect pool the resources of many investors into an
accredited-investor fund. No private market mutual funds currently exist.
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